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The Effects of the Micro-Market Structure on Illinois  





Corn price differentials among Illinois elevators can often exceed transportation costs.  Using 
primary data, we examine the effects of micro-market structure variables on the differentials in 
bids prices offered by Illinois elevators.  Our findings suggest the existence of a highly developed, 
responsive market of competing firms, operating in an industry that can be characterized by 
monopsonistic competition, and to some extent by seasonally induced market power.  Local supply 
conditions, firm productive efficiency, and their operating practices influence price differentials.  
Further, firm type, final market destination of the grain, and period of the marketing year affect 
price differentials.   
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Over the past 30 years, the structure of the U.S. grain industry has undergone 
considerable change.  Sparked by expanding exports, marketing margins increased as the demand 
for marketing infrastructure exceeded the supply.  As firms struggled to adapt to the increased 
demand, investments were made in facilities to handle and ship large volumes for export.  
However, these facilities came on line as exports began to decline (Jones, 1998), creating excess 
capacity.  The excess supply of marketing infrastructure increased competition, lowered 
marketing margins, and led to many mergers, acquisitions, and plant closures.  Pressure on local 
elevators also increased as farmers grew in size and began to ship to sub-terminals or other end 
users.  Unit train rates in the 1970s fostered the development of sub-terminals, and encouraged 
some country elevators to modernize their rail load out facilities, putting pressure on country 
elevators that did not modernize their facilities to change their marketing practices or to leave the 
industry (Dahl, 1998).  Later, rail deregulation allowed for flexible rate structures, eliminating 
much of sub-terminal rate advantages.  In short, a combination of large investment in the 1970s, 
and changes in export demand, in marketing channels, and in the structure of rail rates have 
caused consolidations, closures, and acquisitions in the grain industry.  As firms struggle to 
achieve lower costs associated with larger volumes, this pattern will likely continue.   
 
Increased concentration in the grain industry has raised questions regarding the 
performance of the industry.  At the producer level, these questions are manifested by concerns 
that a lack of competition at the local level may be adversely affecting producer prices.  Over 
time, several researchers (Jones, 1971; Davis and Hill, 1974; McCully, 1999) have investigated 
the relationship between producer price and the micro-market structure of Illinois local markets 
to shed light on this issue.  All of these studies have been based on primary data, and have   3 
concentrated on identifying the factors that influence producer price differences among elevators 
in Illinois.   
 
Jones (1971) analyzed the effect of 14 structural variables on corn prices received by 
producers using data from 37 elevators in the 1969-70 crop year.  The motivation for the work 
was the general concern over price differences that seemed to not be associated with costs in 
time, space and form.   Price data were analyzed using regression procedures, but the findings 
were plagued by a high degree of collinearity.  Nevertheless, Jones concluded that prices paid by 
elevators were influenced by: the number of bids received during the day; the hedging activity of 
the firms; and the degree of services provided by the elevator. A larger number of bids per day 
resulted in higher producer prices, reflecting higher local demand.  More sophisticated elevators 
that actively participated in hedging activities, and provided services beyond simply 
merchandising also paid higher prices.  The availability of different modes of transportation, the 
size of the firm, and the number of competing elevators within a 10-mile radius during the 
harvest period did not influence price differences.  Interestingly, the number of elevators in the 
10-mile radius had a negative effect on price during the period.    
 
Davis and Hill’s work, which is clearly the most comprehensive piece, examined the 
topic more thoroughly, using prices and survey data from a larger number of elevators (41), and a 
more detailed set of variables (35).  They found a highly developed, responsive market of 
competing firms, operating in an industry structure characterized by monopsonistic competition, 
and seasonally induced spatial monopsony.  Specifically, local supply and demand conditions 
were influential in explaining price differentials.  Firms that hedged, shipped longer distances, 
and had high turnover ratios offered higher prices.  The size of the firm was not related to prices 
paid, and consistent with the Jones study the number of firms in competing areas was negatively 
related to price differences.  Further, they discovered that cooperatives paid higher prices than 
private grain firms, and that local support prices were highly influential in determining price.  
 
Here, we revisit the topic of the effect of micro-structure variables on Illinois corn prices 
using firm and local market data in the hopes of providing insight into the changing nature of the 
structure of the grain industry on producer prices.  A sample of 42 elevators throughout Illinois 
that participated in the Market News Service (Illinois Department of Agriculture) was surveyed 
using personal interviews.  We collected information on firm operations (firm type, scale, scope, 
efficiency, market destinations, risk reduction practices), local supply and demand conditions, 
and local competition that could be matched with daily prices the elevators reported to the News 
Service.  Using both least squares and factor analysis, we investigate the relationship between 
corn price and the set of micro-market structure variables.  In addition, we compare our findings 
to Davis and Hill’s findings to assess whether the influence of these micro-market structure 
variables has changed dramatically over time.  
 
The analysis provides insight into the price relationships faced by producers in their local 
markets, suggesting which outlets might be most attractive.  Further, the findings shed light on 
the effect of industry consolidation on micro-level price relationships, and provide some 
indication of what might be expected as further structural changes in the industry occur.   4 
The organization of the paper is straightforward.  In the next section, we provide a 
discussion of theoretical considerations used in the analysis.  This is followed by a discussion of 
the data and its characteristics.  We then discuss the empirical methods, the adjustments made to 
the data, and the empirical models used in the estimation.  This is followed by a presentation and 




Within the context of the efficient market paradigm, prices in space, form, and time 
should differ by no more than the costs of transportation, transformation, and storage.  Prices 
may vary within a band too narrow to provide profit opportunities from arbitrage over space, 
form, and time.   Examination of county elevator bid prices data suggests that in the grain 
industry prices cannot be completely explained by these cost factors. 
 
The cause of price variability among country elevators has been classified into four 
general categories: 1) differences in availability and cost of transportation; 2) differences in 
operating costs; 3) differences in local demand and supply conditions; and 4) market power.   
Categories 1, 2, and 3 provide an economic rationalization for price differentials (Davis and Hill) 
but price differentials can exist only if there is some degree of market power to hold customers at 
a lower bid price. Category 4 implies that the firm is using market power to increase profits or 
returns to management.  
 
Theory suggests that some elements of geographical monopsony can exist in the elevator 
industry by virtue of the spatial relationships among firms (Faminow and Benson).  The extent to 
which this provides market power depends not only on physical distances from producer to an 
elevator and competing firms but on the farmers’ opportunity costs and delivery costs at various 
seasons of the year.  Consequently, perfect competition does not provide a satisfactory norm for 
evaluating performance in this industry with economies of size and where firms are competing 
for product only at the periphery of a market area.  
 
Transportation costs 
Of the four categories of variables listed above, transportation is the one most frequently 
used in explaining geographical differences in price.  Spatial prices in the perfect market would 
be assumed to differ by no more than the cost of transportation between any two points (Bressler 
and King).  This should not be accepted as evidence of adequate performance without a more 
detailed explanation, because price differentials well within the limits of transfer costs may still 
represent monopsony profits (i.e., profits above the required returns to factors) of a magnitude 
greater than acceptable norms.  Transportation cost between two points can at times be 
considerably larger than the gross margin of the elevator at either of the points.  In addition, 
transportation cost is a valid measure of the limits of price differentials between two elevators 
only if grain can logically flow from the low-price point to the high-price point.  Ultimate 
destination and use, cost of handling and routing for transshipment, and seasonal fluctuations in 
storage space often make shipment between two particular points infeasible despite a price 
differential greater than the cost of transportation.   5 
Operating costs 
Under perfect competition the producer would presumably sell to the elevator with the 
highest bid with no knowledge of, or interest in, their costs of operation.  Differences in costs 
would have to be absorbed in the returns to one of the fixed factors of production.  High cost 
firms are usually absorbed or abandoned. Many of the variables in this study were indicators of 
or closely associated with costs of operation.  Utilization of space, volume of business, 
production density, and type of firm should all reflect differences in operating costs and 
efficiency.  To the extent that these explain price differences, they are evidence of the presence of 
market power – not necessarily the abuse of market power. 
 
Demand and supply 
Local demand and supply conditions may also affect prices paid to farmers.  Elevators 
with direct access to a higher priced market or located in an area of high livestock demand may 
have seasonal opportunities for sales that can be passed on to farmers in the form of higher prices 
(Hill).  Fluctuations in local supply relative to other regions or time periods are reflected in 
prices, especially if fixed resources cannot be adjusted to match the supply on hand.  Response to 
seasonal supply is evidenced by wider margins and lower flat price at harvest, as farmers’ 
primary interest is unloading the grain quickly at the closest dump pit and elevator managers are 
trying to slow deliveries to match drying, storage, and shipping capacities that fluctuate on a 
daily basis (Davis) 
 
Market power 
Concern over the abuse of market power stems from 
the ability to vary prices to producers beyond the movement of 
the market. While producers can understand adjusting prices 
as a result of costs, they are not as accepting of lower prices in 
response to lack of competition for the available supply. 
Harvest gluts provide the opportunity for firms with market 
power to adjust prices to the lowest level the market will bear. 
 
Data and Adjustments 
 
The market structure data were collected through a 
survey of 42 Illinois elevators located throughout the state 
during the summer 1998 (Figure 1).  The survey corresponded 
closely to Davis’s original instrument, and was reviewed by a 
panel of industry experts, and pre-tested with elevator 
managers before it was administered.  The elevators 
interviewed are participants in the Market News Service 
(MNS) program to collect representative daily prices for 
Illinois, and as such were selected to accurately represent the 
prices offered to farmers.  Fifteen elevators that participate in 
the MNS price collection program were not interviewed either 
because the firms declined to participate or could not be 
Figure 1.  Distribution of 
Surveyed Firms 
2 Firms 
1 Firm   6 
scheduled during the interview period.  However, a comparison of bid prices for elevators that 
participated and those that did not participate in the survey demonstrated little difference.  Using 
a t-test, we could find no difference between the respondents and non-respondents prices at 
conventional levels of significance.  Further, the firms that were not surveyed were spread 
throughout the state and were a mix of firm types and ownership.   Hence, exclusion of these 
elevators should not reduce the representativeness of the sample.
1   
 
Based on the work by Davis and Hill, the elevators were surveyed to identify potentially 
relevant market structure variables related to the concepts of: 1) local competition; 2) firm type, 
firm efficiency and scale, and the nature and scope of their operations; 3) local supply and 
demand; 4) market destinations of their grain sales; 5) and transportation availability and use.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the relevant statistics for the continuous and discrete variables 
(e.g. do you hedge your purchased grain immediately?, 1 = yes, 0 = no).  A more detailed 
description of the variables is available from the authors. 
 
Daily number 2 yellow corn prices were assembled for the 1996-1997 crop year 
(September 1996 - August 31, 1997) for each of the elevators.  The average daily price for the 
elevators was $2.75/bushel, with a standard deviation of $0.25/bushel.  The simple correlations 
among the prices at the responding elevators are quite high ranging from 0.92 to 0.99.  This is 
somewhat in contrast to the data used by Davis and Hill, and is likely attributable to the 
availability and transmission of market information, and the increased consolidation in markets. 
 
Figure 2 provides a visual presentation of the movement of the average price bid to 
producers and its standard deviation through the period of analysis. The temporal variation in 
prices is categorized into 3 periods, the harvest (September 3 - November 5), distribution 
(November 6 - July 7) and new crop adjustment (July 8 - August 31) periods.  In general terms, 
these periods reflect the influence of the old and expected crops on the current year price.  During 
this year, the harvest period was heavily influenced by relatively poor U.S. and world corn 
production in the previous year, and by extremely small predicted and actual ending stocks.  Corn 
had to be severely rationed in the last quarter of the previous crop year which is reflected in the 
initial high corn prices.  Corn prices then declined to more moderate levels as it became clear that 
actual corn production would exceed the USDA August crop estimates.  The market appears to 
have fully adjusted to harvest conditions as prices firm up after November 5, 1996. During the 
distribution period, prices were relatively steady due to strong domestic consumption, but began 
to move up slightly during the New Crop adjustment period as information on expected 




                                                            
1Two multinational firms with two facilities each declined to participate for 
confidentiality reasons.  The extent of the effect should be minimal since they comprised only 7 
percent of the total population.  Two cooperative firms with two each facilities, also refused to be 
included in the survey.   7  Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Market Structure Variables 
Analysis of Continuous Variables 




Size of Supply Area  17.0  3  90  16.7 
Number of Competing Plants   Within 10 Mile Radius  3.0  0  7  2.2 
Number of Competing Plants   Within 20 Mile Radius  7.8  1  29  6.1 
Number of Elevators in County  12.8  2  35  8.3 
Firm Efficiency Related 
%   of Total Storage Capacity that is Upright  88.6%  26.3%  100.0%  17.1% 
Turnover Ratio  9.3  0.4  176.2  28.4 
Average Annual Utilization of Storage Space  58.4%  25.0%  98.0%  17.1% 
% Full At Harvest  95.2%  61.0%  125.0%  11.1% 
Local Supply and Demand Related 
Density of Production in the Country  57.9  14.9  81.2  20.2 
Yield Per Acre  136.2  88.0  168.0  22.4 
% Farm Sales from Grain  74.6%  46.6%  94.8%  11.9% 
Market Destination Related 
%   of Volume Shipped to in-State Destinations  71.1%  0.0%  100.0%  40.4% 
Firm Scope Related 
Volume of Corn Dried/Total Annual Receipts  38.4%  0.0%  89.6%  27.4% 
Moisture Discount Rate  $0.55  $0.23  $0.70  $0.07 
Merchandizing Margin  $0.07  $0.01  $0.24  $0.04 
Storage Rate to End of June  $0.24  $0.16  $0.33  $0.05 
% Income from Storage  19.2%  0.0%  60.0%  14.2% 
% Income from Drying  17.4%  0.0%  55.0%  13.9% 
% Income from Grain  52.3%  20.0%  99.0%  20.5% 
Firm Scale Related 
Total Storage Capacity  1,651,381  60,000  7,100,000  1,503,625 
Grain Receiving Rate  19,411  2,000  50,000  12,736 
Grain Shipping Rate  16,590  4,000  55,000  11,780 
Total Annual Grain Receipts  5,597,179  200,000  75,000,000  11,818,304 
Transportation Related 
Number of Main Rail Lines to Markets  0.7  0.0  4.0  0.9 
% Volume Shipped by Rail  27.5%  0.0%  100.0%  40.2% 
Number of Markets Regularly Shipped to by Rail  1.9  0.0  9.0  3.0 
Analysis of Discreet Variables 
Market Destination Related  Observations 
Primary Market Out of State  12 
Primary Export  5 
Primary IL Processors  14 
Primary Se Markets  6 
Risk Avoidance Related 
Hedge Immediately  27 
Speculate On Some Corn  8 
Firm Scope Related 
Store Grain for Farmers  37 
Grain Source from Farmers & Elevators  16 
Feed Sold  15 
Seed Or   Chem Sold  21 
Grain Sales to Farmers & Terminals  33 
Transportation Related 
Ship Rail  11 
Ship Barge  4 
Firm Type Related 
Cooperative  20 
Multinational  10 
Single Plant  9 
Subterminal  7   8 
         In general terms, prices among elevators vary by location in the state.  The average daily 
range of prices was $0.29/bushel with a standard deviation of $0.09/bushel. Most of this 
variation is likely attributed to where the firm is located in the state, and must be removed to 
analyze how market structure variables influence the bid prices.   To adjust elevator prices, we 
use the “posted county price” (PCP) provided by the Farm Service Agency.  The PCP is an 
estimated price that reflects the average cash price a producer would receive for grain in their 
county on a specific day.  The prices are based on relevant terminal markets, and a commodity 
differential that varies by commodity and county.  The posted county prices provide what should 
be an average daily cash price for the county where each firm is located.   Subtracting the posted 
county price from the elevator price provides a price differential or margin reflecting the price 
offered by each elevator adjusted for the spatial component.
2  Table 2 provides a summary of the 
adjusted corn prices for the full year, and by period of the year. 
 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics of Adjusted Prices 
Time Period  Average  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
Deviation 
Harvest Period  ($0.036)  ($0.115)  $0.124  $0.059 
Distribution Period   $0.032  ($0.057)  $0.134  $0.045 
New Crop Adjustment (1997)  $0.043  ($0.064)  $0.170  $0.059 
Full Year Average  $0.021 ($0.040)  $0.116  $0.041 
 
 
Empirical Procedures and Results 
 
The relationships between the market structure variables and the adjusted corn price were 
analyzed using three basic methods: 1) bivariate correlations between the market structure 
variables and the adjusted prices; 2) regression analysis between selected market structure 
variables and the adjusted prices; and 3) regression analysis between the market structure 
variables and the adjusted prices using factor analysis.  Regression and factor regression were 
performed for the three periods identified above.  Since the results across the regression and 
factor regression analysis procedures were quite similar, we focus here on the regression analysis 
for brevity and ease of interpretation.  
 
                                                            
2 We also adjusted the prices by the county loan rates which were used by Davis and Hill. 
 The county loan rates vary spatially in a similar manner to the PCP, since the commodity loan 
program tries to ensure everyone the same relative price.  In the 1996-1997 crop year, the 
difference between the PCP and the loan rate was $0.79/bushel with a standard deviation of 
$0.02, but the correlation between the two prices was 0.88 which suggests that they reflect the 
same concept.  The results from that analysis are qualitatively the same as the findings presented 
here.   9 
 The results of the bivariate correlations in the three distinct time periods (i.e., harvest, 
distribution, and new crop adjustment) revealed that the direction and magnitude relationships 
varied considerably over time.  In general, for most of the variables the harvest period 
relationships were smaller in magnitude, and frequently demonstrated opposite signs relative to 
the other time periods.  This suggests that the market structure variables have less influence on 
price during the harvest period than other periods of the year. These findings are somewhat 
consistent with Davis and Hill whose findings reflect lower correlations during the harvest 
period.   Since the distribution period is the period with the largest number of price observations, 
and is the time period when structural relationships should be the strongest, it will be the focus of 
the presentation, but we will provide some discussion on how the relationships changed in other 
periods. 
 
Numerous factors may explain price variability.  Based on economic theory, local supply 
and demand characteristics may influence prices paid to producers.  Large production relative to 
demand can reduce local price during the harvest.  Prices may also be influenced by number of 
buyers in a given area.  Differences in operating costs among elevators in the presence of 
monopsony power can be reflected in price differentials.  In a competitive market, producers 
would presumably sell to the elevator with the highest bid regardless of operating cost of the 
elevator.  Many of the variables here are associated with the costs of operation.  Variables which 
reflect scale, and type of firm may reflect differences in operating costs, and efficiency.  To the 
extent that they are important, they may reflect some degree of market power.  Finally, location 
theory and the accessibility of certain firms to transportation that may permit them direct access 
to higher priced markets may permit them to pass on higher prices to producers.     
 
Specifically, we regress the adjusted price on variables that reflect the scale of the firm, 
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Figure 2.  Seasonal Price Movements in Corn Price Visually Analyzed   10 
measures of local supply and demand, the firm’s risk reduction practices, local competition faced 
by the firm, and the final markets for the grain (equation 1).  The categories were selected based 
on theory and the findings from previous research.  The specific measures for each category were 
chosen based on the bivariate correlations, and to match the variables selected by Davis and Hill. 
  
(1) Adjusted Pricet =  β0   +   β1 Scalet  +   β2 Scopet +   β3 Ownershipt + β4Productive 
Efficiencyt   +   β5 Local Supply/Demandt  +   β6 Local Competitiont  +   β8 Final Marketst 
  +   εt  
 
The results from the least squares estimation are presented in table 3.  The variables 
appear to explain much of the variation in adjusted prices among the elevators, with an adjusted 
R-square of 0.821.  The residuals of the estimated model were examined for normality using the 
Jarque-Bera test and the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (1965), for misspecifications using the using the 
Reset test, and for heterscedasticity using the Reset test (McGuirk, 1993).  
 
Under the null hypothesis that the sample’s error term distribution is normal, the Jarque-
Bera test follows a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom.  For sample sizes, 
critical values were calculated by Bera and Jarque (1981), and more recently by Deb and Sefton 
(1996).  Deb and Sefton’s critical values are used because of their greater accuracy.  At the .05 
level, the critical value is 4.74 which is exceeded by the value of the Jarque-Bera statistic, 6.16, 
and modestly rejects normality.  The Shapiro-Wilk’s test, which was designed for small samples, 
essentially can be thought of as the correlation between a probability plot of expected values 
following a normal distribution, and a probability plot of the actual values.  Lower values of the 
test cause rejection of the null hypothesis.  The Shapiro-Wilk’s statistic is 0.971 which fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of normality at the .05 and .10 levels of significance.   
 
Because the Jarque-Bera test is sensitive to outliers (Spanos, 1986), we examined the 
characteristics of the observations in the tails, and noted some potential for intra firm pricing as a 
source of the outliers.  Our attempts to reduce the problem by including several dummy 
variables, however, proved unsuccessful.  We next considered the possibility of alternative 
functional forms, and transformations of both the dependent and independent variables (Spanos, 
1986), but the situation worsened.  In light of our efforts, and the fact that deviation from 
normality does not appear to substantial, we proceed with the understanding that the quality of 
inference may be modestly affected.  
 
The results for the other set of tests are more favorable.  The Reset test for 
misspecification that regresses the residuals on the explanatory variables, as well as the second 
and third powers of the fitted values, could not reject the null hypothesis that the model was 
correctly specified.  Further, Reset test for heteroscedasticity that regresses the squared residuals 
on the second and third powers of the fitted values, could not reject the null hypothesis that the 
residuals were homoscedastic. 
 
Signs of the coefficients generally accord with expectations.  Several of the firms’ 
practices and characteristics have significant effects on adjusted prices.  Firm scope  (the percent   11 
of income from grain merchandizing) is significant and negative, indicating that firms that make 
a larger percent of their income from grain merchandizing, and hence are less diversified in other 
services, pay lower prices.  Since firms are not receiving income from other sources, they may 
need to generate larger profit from grain merchandizing, resulting in lower prices to producers.  
Although statistically significant, the effect of firm scope is not highly economically significant.  
If a firm moved from receiving 20% of their income from grain to 99% of their income from 
grain (the range of the sample), prices paid would decline by only 0.1 cent/bushel.  
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t-statistics are in parentheses.  Variable definitions are in brackets. 
 
The risk avoidance variable (whether or not a firm hedges it’s purchases immediately) 
indicates that firms that hedge immediately after the purchase of the corn pay $0.015/bushel more   12 
than firms who hedge at a later time.  The reduction in risk related costs for firms that follow this 
practice are passed back to the producer.   
 
The concept of firm productive efficiency is measured by the turnover ratio.  A plot of the 
turnover ratio against the adjusted prices suggested a nonlinear relationship.  Our findings 
indicate that as firms become more efficient, they pay higher prices but at a decreasing rate.  
While the relationship is not highly significant, the weight of the evidence across other time 
periods, and specifications suggests its importance.   
 
The firm scale measure (total annual grain receipts) does have a reasonable sign 
suggesting that firms that handle more grain would pay higher prices, but is not significant to any 
degree.  This may be a result of collinearity with other included variables, particularly firm 
efficiency which is measured by turnover.   
 
Firm ownership is a significant concept in explaining the variation in adjusted prices.  
The results indicate that multinational firms pay more than private firms and cooperatives, with 
multinational firms paying about $0.036/bushel more than private firms.  Cooperative firms on 
the other hand pay $0.015 less than private firms. The findings with regards to the multinational 
firms appear to be rather robust in this context.  One might hypothesize that multinational firms 
are primarily subterminals located on the river and shipping to export which would influence 
price.  However, the inclusion of a dummy variable to differentiate between subterminals and 
other firms, did not change the overall findings appreciably.
3  With regards to the cooperative 
differential, it should be noted that our cooperative prices do not take into account any patronage 
refunds that farmers receive, nor additional services that cooperatives tend to provide with regard 
to providing seed, chemicals and other farm inputs. 
 
The nature of the final market measured by the primary market to which corn is shipped 
(southeast market, export, or Illinois) plays an important role in determining the price producer’s 
receive.  The findings show that firms that ship corn out of state pay more.  Specifically, firms 
that shipped their grain primarily to export pay $0.053/bushel more for corn, and firms that 
shipped to the Southeast pay $0.033/bushel more than firms whose primary market is in Illinois.   
 
Two concepts that are difficult to measure produced unexpected signs.  The local 
competition variable (i.e., the number of competing elevators within a 10-mile radius) was 
expected to be positively related to price, while the local supply variable (density of corn 
production in the county) was expected to be negatively related to price.  With regards to the 
local competition variable, Davis and Hill also found a negative relationship and conjectured that 
since areas of greater supply throughout the state also have more elevators, this variable was 
actually measuring local relative supply.  The sign of the corn density in a county is more 
                                                            
3 The results from the factor regression analysis do not permit direct measurement of the 
“multinational” effect because the multinational variable is grouped with other variables such as 
barge shipping, the importance of the export market, subterminals, turnover ratio, and size of 
supply area, which tend to reflect the importance of larger river elevators.    13 
problematic to explain, but may be suggesting that county production is not appropriate for 
measuring local supply conditions.  We re-estimated the regression for the distribution period 
deleting the production density variable and using the number of competitors variable to 
represent local supply.  This is presented in table 3.  Note the slight reduction in the adjusted R-
square, and the modest changes in the coefficients.  In this specification, normality is not rejected 
at the .05 level of significance, and the other set of tests show no signs of misspecification. 
 
While the results across the regression analysis and the factor regression analysis were 
similar, the results differed across the periods.  The primary difference was during the harvest 
period when neither the regression model nor the factor regression analysis were highly 
consistent with the structure of the data.  For example, the adjusted R-square in the regression 
was .143 in the harvest period compared to the .821 in the distribution period. Similarly, many of 
the coefficients declined in size, non-normality in the residuals became much more prevalent, 
and the statistical significance of the coefficients declined markedly.  While Davis and Hill 
reported a decline in adjusted R-square during the harvest period the reduction was much less, 
with a drop from .778 in the distribution period to .557 in the harvest period.  Part of the decline 
in explanatory power may be attributable to the increased variability during the harvest period 
demonstrated in table 2, but the variability also was high during the new crop adjustment period. 
These findings may be suggesting that during the harvest period the “normal” marketing patterns 
and conduct were not be maintained.  In light of the negative adjusted prices that existed during 
the period (table 2), it appears that elevators may have been exercising monopsony power in the 
market based at the discretion of the individual firm.  Finally, the results during the new crop 
adjustment period were more consistent with the distribution period, registering a higher degree 
of explanatory power than the harvest period, but with significant non-normality, some sign 
reversals, and a lower degree of statistical significance.




Similar to Davis and Hill we find a highly developed, responsive market of competing 
firms, operating in an industry structure which can be characterized by monopsonistic 
competition, and to some extent by seasonally induced market power.  Many of the concepts that 
were used in the Davis and Hill work are still important in explaining the variability in adjusted 
price, but subtle differences do exist which are a reflection of the changing nature of the 
marketing system.
5  Both studies identified the importance of local supply and demand 
conditions, firm productive efficiency, and the operating practices (i.e., risk avoidance, and 
diversification of services) on prices paid.  Major factors affecting producer prices also appear to 
be the final market destination, and the ownership type.  Over a wide range of specifications, 
firms that ship by rail to the southeast markets, or by barge to export pay significantly more than 
                                                            
4 The cooperative, and risk avoidance variables changed signs but were not statistically 
significant. 
5 Due to differences in variable definitions, and procedures used to address spatial price 
differences, a direct comparison of the research efforts is not possible.    14 
firms whose primary markets are in state.  Calculations based on one of Davis and Hill’s 
specifications suggest that firms that ship out of state paid 0.5% more than the average, while our 
findings support that firms that ship out of state pay about 1.7% more than the average.  This 
would suggest that access to more distant markets is more important in explaining price 
differences today.  Both studies find that ownership patterns have an influential effect on prices.  
Hill and Davis find the cooperative firms pay more than private firms.  However, we find that 
cooperatives pay significantly less than other firms, and that multinational firms offer higher 
prices.  As identified earlier, the lower prices offered by cooperatives may reflect that our prices 
do not incorporate patronage refunds, nor the services that cooperatives may offer.  The positive 
effect of multinational firms may reflect the presence of gains from increased productive 
efficiency and coordination that to some degree are being passed back to producers in the form of 
higher prices.  Finally, our findings also indicate that our systematic market structure variables 
seem to have smaller impact during the harvest period.  This is consistent with Davis and Hill, 
but our results are more dramatic.  During the 1996-1997 harvest period, even in the presence of 
past poor U.S. and world corn production and tight stocks, prices that elevators were paying were 
well below the posted county prices.  Firms may have been able to exercise monopsonist power 
at the discretion of the elevator operator.  
 
What are the implications for the future? In all likelihood, during normal periods of 
supply and demand, the market structure variables (micro-market conditions) will continue to 
influence prices. Local prices appear to highly reflect these concepts and as such are imbedded in 
the cost and structure characteristics of the industry.  During the harvest period, when local 
storage capacity is less than the harvest production glut, elevators will be continue to exercise 
market power.   What are the implications of the positive effect of multinational firms on the 
prices received by producers?  Does this suggest that producers should not be concerned about 
the on going consolidation in the grain industry?  Probably some concern is always wise, but it 
may mean that many of these firms, which have substantial capital investment base their 
operations on high volume trade.  In order to attract that trade it becomes important to offer 
prices that are attractive relatively to their competitors.  Further, industry consolidation may be 
improving the operating efficiency of firms in the market channel, and at least to some extent 
passing back these gains to producers.  Clearly, there seems to be a tradeoff between the 
efficiency associated with increased consolidation and the potential for abuse of market power. 
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